Is RFID Security Actually "Broken," or Just Misunderstood?

[Joseph Robin]

I’ve been reading a lot of buzz lately about hardware backdoors in older RFID/NFC chips, and it’s reignited the debate about how secure contactless tech really is. While the vulnerabilities in legacy protocols (like Mifare Classic) are definitely real, it feels like the narrative often ignores how much the technology has advanced since those chips were released.
Modern UHF RFID is lightyears ahead in terms of encryption, range, and secure authentication. It seems like the biggest "vulnerability" these days is just people trying to use 30-year-old standards for modern high-security needs.
I’m curious to hear what the community thinks:

1. Do you think we’ve reached a point where legacy chips should be completely phased out of enterprise environments?
2. Has anyone here moved their own setups (or home projects) to more modern, encrypted UHF standards?

I’ve been working on some hardware integration lately—specifically with the JENCE J4212U for desktop programming and the JENCE J4220U for long-range tracking—and the jump in reliability compared to older proximity readers is night and day.
Looking forward to hearing your thoughts!